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Ten “Rules of Engagement” for UN Intervention in Syria

Posted by Claude Bruderlein on February 13, 2012  |  Commentss Comment  |  RSS Subscribe

As they continue to decide the terms of a potential United Nations intervention in Syria, UN Security Council members should consider ten core strategies that may contribute to the effectiveness and success of a UN mission to Syria. These “rules of engagement” are based on a critical review of professional experience from previous UN and NATO missions in Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as reflected in policy literature. These “rules of engagement” could also provide important considerations for the design of future UN missions in other contexts as well. Each proposed “rule” is accompanied by a series of resources produced by HPCR as well as other relevant sources.

 

1. Fill the security gap as the primary goal of the intervention

The primary goal of a potential UN intervention in Syria is to stop the violence, impose a cease-fire on the parties, and disarm militias, with the purpose of ensuring the protection of the population and the maintenance of public infrastructure. As witnessed in previous missions, such an endeavor is particularly complex in a society that has lived under authoritarian rule for decades and is fragmented along ethnic lines. The displacement of the previous regime is likely to unleash further tensions and rivalries as factions attempt to fill the security and political gap. It is imperative that any UN-mandated peacekeeping forces enjoy primacy over the maintenance of law and order, as well as retain the authority to use force in self-defense and in defense of civilians. The military capabilities and experience of the peace operations members is of greater importance than their national origin. This mission should operate under a unified command structure, responding to a very capable and astute military leadership.

2. Clarify objectives

As demonstrated in previous negotiations, the text of UNSC resolutions is often the product of difficult negotiation, which privilege the lowest common denominator among UNSC members. These negotiations often result vague language that comes at a high cost in terms of clarity of objectives. And it is typically upon this lack of clarity of the objectives that resources are mobilized and strategies and tactics are developed. UNSC members are well advised to take the time and effort necessary to devise security and political objectives that are adapted to the situation in Syria and that are drafted in a way that provides clear ultimate goals, timelines, and sequences for UN action. While these terms can be potentially revised in light of developments in the field, they are likely to be critical to the mission in its first months.

3. Establish an independent monitoring, reporting, and fact-finding mission to investigate violations of IHL and human rights

Syria lacks a legacy of transparency and credible information-sharing mechanisms. It will be critical in this context to ensure the collection, analysis, and inquiries on past, present, and future violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law by all parties concerned, including peace operations members. These efforts are critical to the establishment of a transparent and accountable process based on international standards of practice in monitoring and reporting. As the Syrian society prepares to seek justice and undertake processes for reconciliation, the ability of a UN mission to demonstrate transparent and accountable monitoring and reporting mechanisms will be a great asset.

4. Set the terms of a national justice and reconciliation process

The UNSC should consider setting the terms for the creation of a justice and reconciliation mechanism at the national level in order to gather information on past violations of human rights law and other grievances. Setting those terms could also provide a means to open the space for forward-looking dialogue on a political transition. This justice and reconciliation mechanism should, at a minimum, be empowered to collect evidence, interview witnesses, and develop dossiers, which may be transferred to a specially designated criminal court established under a hybrid system, such as in the case of Sierra Leone. Without a sufficient justice and reconciliation process, it is unlikely that the UN can provide enough grounds for a political transformation in light of the reported cases of abuse and discrimination.

5. Adopt a clear timeline for the rehabilitation of political institutions

Many past missions have stumbled in (re)establishing viable political institutions. The planning of these efforts suffered from being too vague and too hastily instituted, as well as from not sufficiently involving actors at the national and local level in their design. The UNSC should ensure that, from the text of the resolution onward, a timeline is adopted for the purpose of providing a clear horizon for the reestablishment of political authorities based on democratic values and respect for human rights.

6. Ensure respect for humanitarian law and human rights by peace operations members

As noted above, a core goal of a potential UN intervention is to stop violence against civilians. In doing so, the UNSC should ensure that contributing troops are properly trained and informed about their legal obligations under IHL and human rights law. The UNSC should also ensure that contributing governments are committed and able to investigate alleged violations, enforce these rules, and provide remedies for victims. Experience has shown that violations of basic human rights occur even in the hands of the best-trained and equipped military forces.

7. Respect and promote independent, neutral, and effective humanitarian action

Some UN missions — while attempting to increase the efficiency of the intervention and the coordination among humanitarian actors — have been tempted to use relief operations as a means to win the “hearts and minds” of the population toward the political objectives of the mission. This short-sighted strategy has, over time, endangered the core principles of neutrality and independence of humanitarian action in many situations. As with other emergency operations, coordinating and integrating humanitarian activities — in terms of security management, logistics, transport, and communications — are critical aspects of efficiency and efficacy. Yet, the perception of neutrality and impartiality is of great value, not only for the humanitarian organizations, but for the overall UN mission as well. Understanding that the welfare of the population is a priority, it is imperative for the UN mission’s legitimacy that humanitarian actors not be interfered with. By prioritizing the welfare of the population in times of emergency, the UN mission will foster political support from communities as it aims to create sustainable political processes.

8. Focus on maintaining public infrastructure

As seen in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, the legitimacy of the mission will rely partly on its ability to facilitate the restoration of public services in key sectors, such as health, water and sanitation, education, and power supply.. Efforts should be made to curtail, as much as possible, the need for emergency relief assistance. The UN should invest, where possible, in maintaining and rebuilding the capacity of public authorities to deliver essential services. Syria is a mid-level developing country that may not require emergency assistance beyond a few weeks following the reestablishment of public order. Restoring this capacity is of primary importance for both logistical and political reasons. In this context, the UN mission should avoid calling in major development agencies to undertake direct interventions in place of the the government. These programs, as demonstrated in previous missions, draw extensive human resources away from public authorities and increase the sense of the population that it has lost control over the process of transition. While agencies can provide technical support to ministries and municipalities, they will need to be patient as those entities are rebuilding their capacity and legitimacy within the communities.

9. Build on coping capabilities at the community level

Ultimately, a large part of the success of the UN mission will be in the hands of local communities and the extent to which they buy into the political transition. In this context, political, security, and development agendas should be geared toward supporting coping mechanisms at the community level to reinitiate economic development, trade, and communication with the outside world. The UN system still has a lot to learn from local NGOs on how to engage with communities, particularly dealing with local mediation efforts, community mobilization, human rights culture, and social development. The UNSC should consider mandating its mission to work closely with Syrian civil society, as well as international NGOs with expertise in peacebuilding at the community level, in order to jump start projects that can have an immediate impact on the perceptions and buy-in of the communities.

10. Communicate and engage with local leaders

Many of the previous missions stumbled due to the absence of a consolidated leadership at the national level with which the missions could engage on political reforms. Attempts to import such leadership from the more educated and savvy diaspora has typically failed to mobilize the support of the population toward the transition process. However expedient such temptations are, a UN mission to Syria should be given the space and time to communicate and engage with local leaders and seek their contribution in defining the process, agenda, and timeline of political transition and social reconstruction. Such an approach promotes democratic values, and also helps to ensure that political forces from the diaspora, with limited stake into local economic and social development, are allowed to participate in the national reconciliation efforts yet not to dictate the terms of it. This type of engagement is necessarily time consuming, requires proper language and cultural skills, and is fraught with local dilemmas for which the UN cannot always provide much support or solutions. Yet, as the fundamental rehabilitation of a political system will take place at the community level, as demonstrated in other instances of UN intervention, communities should see themselves — and should be seen — as important partners of the UN in this process.

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